Evidence on international capital ‡ows suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) is less volatile than other …nancial ‡ows. To explain this …nding, I model international capital ‡ows under the assumptions of imperfect enforcement of …nancial contracts and inalienability of FDI. Imperfect enforcement of contracts leads to endogenous …nancing constraints and the pricing of default risk. Inalienability implies that it is not as advantageous to expropriate FDI relative to other ‡ows. These features combine to give a risk sharing advantage to FDI over other capital ‡ows. This risk sharing advantage of FDI translates into a lower default premium and lower sensitivity to changes in a country's …nancing constraint.
Introduction
International private capital ‡ows represent a major source of …nancing of economic activity in developing countries. For these countries, it is often argued that a critical component of international …nancing is foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI). 1 The argument is based on two observations. First, foreign direct investment is less volatile than other forms of international capital ‡ows. Second, the share of FDI is higher for developing versus developed countries. 2 As discussed below, existing theories of FDI have di¢culty in accounting for these facts. This paper attempts to …ll in this vacuum by arguing that FDI is a form of investment that is best suited to provide risk sharing in a world economy where …nancial contracts are plagued by imperfect enforcement mechanisms.
There is substantial evidence that FDI ‡ows are less volatile than other forms of …nancial ‡ows to developing countries. Some of this evidence comes from crisis episodes. The World Bank's (1999a) "Global Financial Development" reports that during the Latin America debt crisis of the 1980's FDI ‡ows to these countries collapsed, but the fall in other long-term (and short-term) ‡ows from banks and the bond market was 7 times greater. A parallel story occurred during the Mexican debt crisis in 1994. FDI in ‡ows fell from US $11 billion in 1994 to US $8 billion in 1996, a drop of 27 percent, and recovered fully by 1997. However, portfolio equity and debt ‡ows fell by 89 percent and 45 percent respectively in just one year, from 1994 to 1995.
The 1997 currency and banking crisis in East Asia saw a drop of 22 percent in net-long term in ‡ows to these countries, while FDI was extremely resilient falling by less than 5 percent from 1997 to 1998. 3 Evidence of di¤erential volatility is also abundant outside crisis periods. Figure 1 plots the histogram of the (absolute value of the) ratio of the coe¢cient of variation of net private FDI in ‡ows versus that of net private non-FDI in ‡ows. 4 The data is from the World Bank 1 Investment through FDI alone represents a large portion of overall domestic investment. For example, in the 10 major recipient countries of FDI during the 1990-97 period-all developing countries-FDI accounted for an average of roughly 20 percent of total private investment. For the overall sample of developing countries it accounted for 8.7 percent of gross …xed capital formation in 1996 (see World Bank 1999a). Furthermore, FDI out ‡ows from developing countries were roughly non-existent over the 1990-97 period. The evidence is quite di¤erent for developed countries. While these countries have the largest in ‡ows and out ‡ows of FDI, the net ‡ow is typically small. 2 Evidence on the relative size of FDI into developing countries is brie ‡y discussed in section 5.1. 3 The countries considered are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The data on net in ‡ows to these countries includes FDI and o¢cial ‡ows, so 22 percent is presumably a lower bound on the reduction of private capital in ‡ows. 4 Both ‡ows are normalized by gross private capital ‡ows. Normalizing by GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity or using HP-…ltered ‡ows in constant dollar terms gives similar results. This di¤erence in volatilities is also present when restricting attention to long term ‡ows. Lipsey (1999) computes the coe¢cient of variation of several capital ‡ows from 1969-1993.
He reports signi…cant di¤erences in volatility between FDI and other net long term ‡ows for developing countries and to a lesser extent to developed countries: the ratio of FDI's volatility to that of long term non-FDI ‡ows is about 0.59 for Latin America, 0.74 for South East Asia, 0.86 for Europe, and 0.88 for the US. 5 [ Figure 1 here.]
My point of departure is this: a typical characteristic of FDI into developing countries is that recipient countries are generally unable to operate (at least as e¢ciently, if at all) these investments without the intangible assets of the multinational company. Examples of these intangible assets include human and organization capital, and technological advances. Because these assets are inalienable to a large extent, their residual value to the recipient country is relatively small. For example, multinationals typically rely on blueprints to secure their investments. This is true in high technology industries such as pharmaceuticals, but also in low technology ones such as the soft drink industry. 6 However, most other investments including 5 UNCTAD (1998), World Bank (1999a), and Lipsey (1999 Lipsey ( , 2001 ) also report that FDI is unconditionally less volatile than other ‡ows. Also related are the studies by Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and Popper (1996) who observe that FDI responds less to shocks, and Sarno and Taylor (1999) that show that FDI is mostly composed of a permanent component. Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) is the only study I know of that fails to con…rm this …nding. However, they use a much smaller sample of 5 developed and 5 developing countries. 6 Clearly, though, by investing abroad multinationals increase the likelihood of dissipating the value of their intangible assets. This occurs because host countries of FDI can hire a specialized workforce from abroad, or train their own work force. However, these possibilities are …nancially costly and typically involve a large time lag from expropriation to using the capital in place. Reverse engineering is one of the most popular ways to imitate a technology. Mans…eld et al. (1981) report the estimated imitation cost and time for 48 new products in the Chemicals, Drugs, Electronics, and machinery industries. These estimates are based on surveys to some of the largest US …rms in these 4 industries. For innovations costing over $1 million, an average of 23 percent of the products cost more to imitate than they did to innovate and an average of 17 percent of the products took more time to imitate than they did to innovate. These authors also report that most products cost at least 50 percent in time and dollars to replicate. It is our belief that these imitation costs are likely to be much higher for …rms in developing and low income countries. In a di¤erent survey, Mans…eld and Romeo (1980) report that 10 out of 26 technologies became known to some non-US competitor after at least 4.5 years. bank loans and bond …nancing are fully appropriable. For my analysis, partial inalienability is the main di¤erence between direct investment and other international in ‡ows of capital.
The existence of intangible assets in many production/managerial activities together with market imperfections that prevent the correct pricing of these assets has been used to justify transnational corporations, i.e., intra-…rm as opposed to arm's length relationships (e.g. Caves (1982, 1996) ). The empirical evidence recently surveyed by Caves (1996) broadly suggests that this is an important force driving FDI. For example, research and development and advertising expenditures-typically associated with the presence of intangible assets-are larger in industries in which there is a stronger presence of transnational corporations.
The second main assumption of the paper is that international …nancing contracts lack the proper mechanisms to enforce repayment. In Section 2, I build a model of the composition of international capital ‡ows to developing countries based on these two main premises: (i) that FDI is partly inalienable to the extent that it comprises intangible assets, and (ii) that sovereign capital ‡ows are subject to expropriation due to the lack international enforcement mechanisms.
Section 3 analyses the predictions of the model for the optimal composition of international capital ‡ows. First, because of expropriation risk, capital ‡ows into …nancially constrained countries command a default premium. Second, because FDI is partly inalienable, the default premium associated with FDI in ‡ows is lower than that of non-FDI in ‡ows giving it a risk sharing advantage. This implies that …nancially constrained countries get a larger share of FDI. Moreover, a higher default premium to non-FDI ‡ows means that changes in a country's borrowing constraint a¤ect non-FDI ‡ows to a greater extent.
In section 4, I use numerical simulations methods to investigate the ability of the model to quantitatively match the empirical volatility of FDI versus other capital ‡ows. I start by illustrating the dynamics of international capital ‡ows implied by the …nancing contract. I then extend the model to allow for the possibility of exogenous contract terminations. This permits the computation of the stationary distribution of countries implied by the model. Using the stationary distribution I …nd that the model is able to capture the relative volatility di¤erences in capital ‡ows observed in the data. The model also generates considerable persistence in ‡ows partly because it contains an endogenous propagation mechanism. The dynamics of capital ‡ows into developed and developing countries are also analyzed.
In Section 5, I investigate empirically the model's new prediction that …nancially constrained countries have relatively larger in ‡ows of FDI capital. I identify …nancing constraints with low sovereign credit ratings, but also, more broadly, with low overall country risk ratings. I …nd a negative association between the FDI share of gross private ‡ows and a country's credit rating.
Moreover, the association between FDI share and credit rating is robust to conditioning on other variables, including GDP. The variation in credit rating accounts for a signi…cant portion of the total variation in FDI in ‡ows. This represents new evidence on the dynamics of FDI and is broadly supportive of the model. Also supportive of the model is the evidence presented in subsection 5.2 that FDI and non-FDI private capital ‡ows (as percentages of gross ‡ows) display considerable persistence.
The combined empirical …ndings I discuss are hard to understand with other explanations for FDI. First, theories based on competitive advantages (e.g. lower input costs, supply of skilled/unskilled workers, market proximity) or taxation do not seem able to explain the systematic cross sectional evidence that FDI ‡ows are less volatile than other investment ‡ows, though they are certainly useful in accounting for the level of FDI (see Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) for a discussion of taxes and capital ‡ows). Second, FDI ‡ows to developing countries are mostly in the form of Green…eld investments as opposed to mergers and acquisitions. 7 Hence, it does not seem a good starting point to explain FDI ‡ows to developing countries by appealing to high domestic corporate costs of external …nancing (see Froot and Stein 1991). 8 Finally, my theory does not make use of investment irreversibilities (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 1994) or inertia type arguments as in Albuquerque and Rebelo (2000) . Though these are likely candidates to explain the lower volatility of FDI, they would have a hard time in explaining the connection between a country's credit worthiness and FDI ‡ows. Two important remarks about FDI being irreversible are in order. In practice, FDI can be easily reversed. For example, the subsidiary can borrow against its collateral domestically, and lend the money back to the parent company. As another example, note that a considerable portion of FDI is intercompany debt, which the parent company may recall at short notice. (Both strategies would result in a drop in measured FDI. 9 ) The second remark is that in bad times all …nancial products are 7 Green…eld investments (e.g. setting up a subsidiary from scratch) accounted for roughly 87 percent of the FDI into developing countries in 1997, and 94 percent in 1991 (see UNCTAD (1998)). 8 It could be argued that more favorable asset prices resulting from large exchange rate depreciations, like those in East Asia in 1997, would favor FDI. But, then, how do we rationalize the large decrease in portfolio equity ‡ows in East Asian countries? 9 Measures of FDI usually report all …nancial transactions between a foreign multinational and a subsidiary that is at least 10 percent owned by the former (e.g. retained earnings, equity capital, and intercompany debt transactions). An investment with an equity share of less than 10 percent may be counted as FDI if a management illiquid and thus costlier to move around. Thus, the role of irreversibility becomes an empirical question.
The model is closely related to that of Thomas and Worral (1994) . They analyze the investment dynamics of multinational companies. I extend their framework to accommodate heterogeneous capital ‡ows, the possibility of exogenous contract terminations and the simulation of a worldwide distribution of countries. I also explicitly model the lifetime utility maximization problem of the domestic consumer in autarky. The model is also related to Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) who study foreign direct investment under the risk of expropriation. They argue that the level of intangible assets is an important determinant of heterogeneity in international capital ‡ows. They show that it may be optimal for investors to overinvest in technologies with more intangible assets in order to reduce the risk of expropriation. I extend their analysis by also modeling foreign indirect investments, where the absence of intangible assets increases the incentives to expropriate. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of the normative implications of my results.
Appendix A contains the proofs of the propositions in the paper.
The Model
I think of the model as one of lending to developing countries. 10 First, for these economies there is a stronger belief that legal enforcement of international contracts is subject to political willingness and uncertainty, and hence is more fragile. Second, I think that capital ‡ows among developed countries are very di¤erent in nature. 11 In line with this interpretation, I model the supply of international capital by assuming that international investors are risk neutral and unconstrained.
The basic framework is from Thomas and Worral (1994) . As discussed above, I enrich their model along several dimensions. I allow heterogeneous capital ‡ows. In doing so, I
impose considerable symmetry between the di¤erent capital ‡ows. Besides tractability, the main purpose is to isolate the e¤ect of the inalienability of FDI. position is implied. Balance of payments data do not include capital raised in host countries as FDI. Also they omit cross-border ‡ows of goods and services. For more details see UNCTAD (1999 The economy consists of many international investors and a domestic representative consumer. All international investors are alike and the domestic consumer is indi¤erent between whom he meets. The domestic consumer is risk averse while international investors are risk neutral. There are three investment opportunities available to international investors. One is the international bond market which o¤ers a constant interest rate r. International investors can also invest in two projects located in the host country. The two projects di¤er …rst and foremost in the degree to which they can be appropriated by the domestic consumer. I interpret ‡ows into the inalienable project as FDI and ‡ows into the alienable project as non-FDI. 12 I do not model the location/entry decision of multinational companies. This is an extremely useful abstraction that allows me to focus on the dynamics of the …nancial capacity of the host country.
In this setup long term contracts between investors and borrowers are written contingent on any possible history of events. As Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Green (1987) originally showed, there exists a recursive representation to these contracts. To conserve on notation and space I make use of these results to write the problem directly in a recursive fashion. I shall make brief use of the sequence representation of these contracts in the next section.
There is only one aggregate shock s. The aggregate shock s follows the continuous autoregressive process with serial correlation ½, and unconditional mean ¹ s,
The choice of a single aggregate shock is motivated by a desire to remove any asymmetries between the investment choices besides those originating from the inalienability of FDI. It is easiest to think of the aggregate shock as being total factor productivity shocks, but we may also think of shocks to the country's banking system, or to the exchange rate system. The initial shock s 0 is drawn from a distribution F (s).
At the beginning of the period the long term contract assigns an utility level V to the 1 2 The International Monetary Fund's de…nition of FDI comprehends all investments with lasting corporate control interests on …rms residing in other countries, typically with equity shares of 10 percent or more (see Lipsey (1999) for a summary and history of several de…nitions). It is clear from discussions at the IMF on measurement issues that the goal in the breakdown between FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment (e.g. equity securities, debt securities, money market instruments and …nancial derivatives) and Other Investments (e.g., trade credit, loans, …nancial leases, currency deposits) is to capture under FDI those ‡ows which normally include the transfer of intangible assets (see for example UNCTAD 1999). Therefore, the focus of IMF's de…nition and mine is on measuring the same ‡ows. As Caves (1996, p. 1) puts it: "Exact de…nitions are unimportant for this study, because economic analysis in fact emphasizes that at the de…nitional margins decision makers face close trade-o¤s rather than bimodal choices." developing country. This life-time utility level is obtained through a period utility of ln (c) and a continuation value V (s 0 ). Thus, the promise keeping constraint:
where E (:js) is the conditional expectations operator.
The contract speci…es how output is divided between domestic consumption (c), repayment of the loan's principal and interest ((k f + k o ) (1 + r)), and additional transfers (¿ (s 0 )) (these may include additional interest charges for default premia or more loans to the country).
The output results from two investment projects in which international investors participate.
These projects may di¤er in their capital share ® f , ® o < 1. This gives the aggregate resource constraint:
where k f is the level of FDI or inalienable capital input, k o is the level of appropriable capital input, and A is a relative scale factor. The model embeds tax advantages of FDI whenever A > 1. As it will become clear later on the scale factor can explain FDI levels, but not the relative volatility of FDI in the absence of inalienability. I abstract from other factors of production by assuming they are …xed factors. This of course ignores any crowding out or crowding in that might ensue, but is irrelevant if the impact on the domestic factor markets of these heterogenous forms of capital is symmetric. 13 For simplicity, I assume full depreciation for both capital stocks. Besides the di¤erent capital shares, the only other distinction I make between FDI and other capital ‡ows is in the way each of the inputs a¤ects the developing country's utility level under autarky,
The host country's representative consumer cannot commit to a long term contract. International investors have commitment, but of a limited nature in that a participation constraint must be satis…ed. As in Thomas and Worral (1994) I de…ne a self-enforcing contract by requiring that capital ‡ows obey two participation constraints. 14 For both types of agents the 1 3 Since all of the …nancing comes from the international lender, one might think that the contract would look di¤erent if the domestic investor was allowed to self-…nance some of the production. In fact the international lender is doing all the feasible and e¢cient …nancing. In the simulations below, the time series of average consumption growth for the domestic investor is positive, which re ‡ects the fact that his required rate of return is higher than r. However, he can only save at r. See also the discussion on contract implementation in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) . 1 4 This assumption is more in line with real life scenarios. Giving full commitment to the international investor does not change the qualitative nature of my main results. participation constraint says that the utility under the contract is at least as large as the utility outside the contract. That is, for the domestic consumer:
for every s 0 2 S. Constraint (4) is realized, the investment of k o , and k f is made, and consumption is decided. 15 Afterwards, the aggregate shock is observed and output is generated.
At this stage the consumer may choose to default on the contract. If default does not occur, output is allocated into consumption and other transfers as previously determined.
[ Figure 2 here.]
The utility of an international investor is the expected sum of discounted net ‡ows (at rate r) from the borrowing country:
subject to (2)- (4) and to B (V (s 0 ) ; s 0 )¸0 for all s 0 . The constraint that V (s 0 )¸V , with V > ¡1, is introduced because the period utility of the domestic consumer is unbounded. The value of V can be interpreted as the lowest utility the domestic consumer can expect to get under autarky. 16 Note that the problem of maximizing (5) subject to (2)- (4) is formally very similar to the usual small open economy problem in International Macroeconomics. Except for the non-default constraint (4), the main di¤erence is that instead of maximizing the consumer's lifetime utility subject to resource and balance of payments constraints, I solve for the dual problem in which the international investor's lifetime utility is maximized subject to a resource constraint and the agents' utility (2) . I show below that the solution to (5) lies on the Pareto frontier and so the two problems coincide.
Let me now describe the borrower's autarky problem. In solving for the borrower's autarky solution it is assumed that: (i) default occurs on both capital ‡ows simultaneously; 17 (ii) without the human capital from the international investor the FDI technology cannot be operated any longer once the country defaults; and (iii) only a share of the current revenues µ 2 [0; 1] can be transformed into investment towards the appropriable activity or consumption. Thus, 1 ¡ µ is the degree of inalienability of FDI. Even though I model (ii) and (iii) as exogenous, they can be motivated as a rational response of multinational …rms to country risk (Eaton and Gersovitz 1984) .
Under these assumptions, the value of the host country's representative consumer under autarky is given by:
subject to the resource constraint
and the Bellman equation
It is easy to check that
where d 0 , d 1 , and d 2 are positive constants. 18 In deriving (6), I make extensive use of the assumptions of log-utility and full depreciation.
What is the role of the assumptions on the FDI activity? It is critical that some output from the FDI activity be lost if the country defaults. This is the basic assumption of the paper. It is 1 7 Note that the possibility of default on only one ‡ow at a time favors the risk sharing role of FDI. Again, this symmetry is intended to isolate the e¤ect of the inalienability on the volatility of both ‡ows. 1 8 These constants are:
, and
not important that the output from the FDI activity can also be used for investment, although this makes the results stronger and easier to derive. Finally, I want to emphasize that µ does not act like a tax, though it could be interpreted as a state-contingent tax: FDI ‡ows are not subject to this tax if the country does not default (see (3)).
Equilibrium Contracts
At the start of the contract the international investor makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of contingent sequences of fk ot ; k ft ; ¿ t ; c t g 1 t=0 to the domestic consumer. An equilibrium contract gives just enough expected revenues to the international investor that compensates her for any initial …xed costs I,
These …xed costs may be related to setting up a factory or promoting a brand name.
Having formulated the problem I now turn to a characterization of the solution.
The Optimal Composition of Capital Flows
The self-enforcing nature of the contract, in particular the constraint B (V; s)¸0, makes it infeasible to use standard dynamic programming arguments to show the existence and uniqueness of a value function B (:). However, I can show an important property of the function B (:).
Let h t = fs l ; k ol ; k fl ; ¿ l ; c l g t l=0 be an history of events up to time t. Consider the set ¡ (h t ) of all contract feasible sequences°(h t ) = fk ol ; k fl ; ¿ l ; c l g 1 l=t . De…ne recursively the domestic consumer's utility V (°;
from following the recommendations of contract°after history h t . Any contract in ¡ satis…es the self-enforcing constraints, the resource constraint (3), and V (°; h t+1 )¸V from time t¸0 onwards. The constrained-Pareto frontier at time t that yields at least utility V t to the domestic consumer is de…ned by the mapping: The …rst result says that the constrained-Pareto frontier can be computed using the recursive approach outlined in the previous section. Let T be the operator described in (5) , that is
where the maximization is subject to (2)- (4) and
, by iterating on the operator T .
Lemma 1 (Thomas and Worral 1994, Lemma 1) f (n) converges to B P pointwise.
Thus, I can take B (V; s) = B P (V; s). An immediate consequence of this lemma is that the optimal contract will give allocations that lie in the downward sloping portion of the constrainedPareto frontier. Together with the fact that in equilibrium the domestic consumer is extracting the maximal surplus from the investor, these allocations are the best possible ones the domestic consumer would have chosen if he were to choose a contract°himself for any given value of B.
Assume that B is concave in V for each s. This will be con…rmed in all the simulations below.
Suppose the current state is (V; s). Let ¼ 0 be the conditional density of the aggregate shock.
Attach the Lagrange multipliers¸;
. Eliminating the variable ¿, the …rst order conditions for the investor's problem are:
together with the constraints (2), (4), and B (V (s 0 ) ; s 0 )¸0 and V (s 0 )¸V for each shock s 0 .
The envelope condition is: B V (V; s) = ¡¸. Let the solution to this system of equations be the
The …rst condition together with the envelope condition just say that the slope of the constrained-Pareto frontier is given by E [Ã (s 0 ) js] ¡ c < 0. Thus, the expected value of the shadow cost of the default constraints is bounded above by c. The second and third conditions dictate the optimal composition of capital ‡ows. In each, the rate of return, denoted r kx , or marginal expected product of capital, is equated to its marginal cost r, plus a default premium.
The default premium for capital k x is de…ned as E [Ã (s 0 ) U kx (k f ; k o ; s 0 ) js]; it measures the marginal cost of higher incentives to default brought about by a marginal unit of capital.
Finally, the last condition describes the trade-o¤ across di¤erent states of nature when choosing continuation utility levels.
I use the …rst order conditions (7) and (8) to de…ne …nancing constraints in the model.
A …nancially constrained country has positive default premium of either capital. This is a de…nition of …nancing constraints on the intensive margin.
I start with the analysis of capital ‡ows when there is full commitment by both agents.
This will give a benchmark for comparison and will help understand the role of commitment in generating …nancial constraints.
The Perfect Enforcement Solution
To better understand the role of imperfect enforcement and the inalienability of 
for a country starting the current period with shock s. There is no default premium. The ratio of the elasticity of k f to changes in s to the elasticity of
Proofs of all propositions can be found in the appendix. Clearly, the self-enforcing constraints are at the heart of the …nancing friction. In an economy with perfect enforcement the default premium is zero and marginal revenues are equalized. The di¤erent sensitivity of capital ‡ows can only arise because the capital shares di¤er across the investment opportunities.
Inalienability plays no role. Hence, the role of inalienability is directly linked to the existence of borrowing constraints and default risk.
What is the role of taxes in explaining the relative volatility of FDI? Recall that A > 1 has the interpretation of a subsidy to FDI. Subsidies are irrelevant to the relative sensitivity of FDI (though they are a key determinant of the level of FDI). As we will see below this will also be the case when µ = 0 (maximum inalienability of FDI).
The Imperfect Enforcement Solution
The …rst main prediction of the model concerns the default premium and level of FDI versus other ‡ows.
Proposition 3
The default premium is higher for non-FDI ‡ows. When the elasticities ® f = ® o and A¸1, the level of FDI is no smaller than the level of appropriable capital, i.e., k ¤ f¸k ¤ o . Furthermore, both ‡ows will be below their full enforcement levels k ¤ f · k F f and k ¤ o · k F o , with inequality holding strictly every time the country is constrained.
If A < 1 then the concavity of the production functions is not the only ingredient a¤ecting the composition of capital ‡ows. Hence, it is possible to have k ¤ f < k ¤ o when A is small enough. With the …nancing frictions in place the default premium becomes positive for both ‡ows.
FDI's default premium is lower because these ‡ows are less appropriable under default, which implies that FDI ‡ows are relatively closer to their unconstrained optimum. This leads to a corollary that constitutes a new prediction of the model regarding FDI ‡ows: 19 Corollary 4 The FDI share of total private in ‡ows is higher for …nancially constrained countries if, and only if µ < 1.
How does the relation between default premia and size translate into volatility? This question is in general very hard to answer, but when shocks are iid it turns out that there is a sharp result.
Proposition 5 Let the aggregate shock be iid. The ratio of the elasticity of k f to changes in V to the elasticity of k o to changes in V is smaller than (1 ¡ ® o ) = (1 ¡ ® f ) if, and only if µ < 1. This is the second main result of the paper. It implies that for …nancially constrained countries FDI is less volatile than non-FDI ‡ows, provided FDI is partly inalienable µ < 1 and ® o¸®f . 20 To understand this result, and for simplicity of exposition, let the input shares be identical (i.e., ® f = ® o ). Recall from Proposition 3 that in this case FDI carries a smaller default premium or rate of return. Thus, shocks that increase the borrowing capacity of the host country (by increasing future V ) lead to larger adjustments of non-FDI ‡ows, because these ‡ows have higher rates of return and are farther away from the optimum. 1 9 This result contrasts with Kraay et al. (2000) who also use the inalienability of FDI to discuss its relative size. Their result seems to depend upon the assumption that the probability of default does not change as more FDI and non-FDI capital ‡ow into the country.
2 0 Note that this proposition and proposition 2 cannot be used to compare relative volatilities across constrained and unconstrained countries. This is so because with iid shocks volatilities of ‡ows under perfect enforcement are trivially zero. [ Table 1 I choose V to be 10 percent below the autarky level of life-time utility which is capable of sustaining the optimal unconstrained choices of k F f and k F o for the lowest realization of the shock. I choose the initial investment I such that all countries start at a value of V 0 = V . At this value, the average starting output is 28 percent below the unconstrained optimal level of output at the mean shock. This number is in line with reported output losses in economies that have experienced banking or currency crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) 
Contract Transition Dynamics
To get a better feel for the model it is interesting to analyze the path dynamics generated by the optimal …nancing contract. Figure 3 presents the time 0 unconditional expected path dynamics implied by the contract. These dynamics are computed by averaging across 5000 simulations of 10 years each. The dynamics of the default probability, capital ‡ows, utility levels, transfers, rates of return, and consumption are analyzed. Absent in the picture is the plot for the aggregate shock because at time 0 the future expected level of the aggregate shock is its mean.
[ Figure 3 here.]
The domestic investor, sitting at time 0, expects the contract to give him increasing amounts of utility over time. By building up the utility level of the domestic investor, the international lender makes staying in the contract more desirable. This implies that more and more capital can be advanced without a¤ecting the incentives to default. In fact, looking forward, the domestic investor faces a downward probability of being …nancially constrained. At year 5 already, the time zero (unconditional) probability of being unconstrained forever after is 100 percent. 22 At this point the borrower is always strictly better o¤ staying in the contract rather than defaulting, and the economy looks like one with a perfect enforcement technology. As …nancing constraints become less binding and more capital is advanced, particularly non-FDI (which has the highest rate of return), rates of return on domestic investments decline. The feature that capital in ‡ow shares converge to 50 percent of total in ‡ows results trivially from having imposed absolute symmetry on the two technologies in the baseline parameterization.
The easing of …nancing constraints leads to increased output and consumption. However, growth in both output and consumption slows down over time as the country approaches the economy with perfect enforcement technology.
The low utility values for the domestic investor at the start of the contract contrast with the high levels commanded by the international lender. The international lender makes money earlier in the life of the contract as repayment for the initial investment I and capital advances. Accordingly, transfers (¿) are highest earlier in the life of the contract. Table 2 The simulation results in Table 2 suggest that the unconditional volatility of FDI is smaller than that of other ‡ows even when aggregate shocks are persistent. Quantitatively, the model is able to capture a signi…cant di¤erential in volatilities with the ratio of coe¢cients of variations (or standard deviations of detrended ‡ows) closely matching the numbers discussed in the Introduction. 23 Recall that Proposition 2 shows that for unconstrained countries ® f = ® o implies that volatilities are also equalized. Thus, the volatility di¤erentials observed in Table 2 depend on countries being constrained during the simulation period.
Model Statistics
[ Table 2 here.]
Lower persistence of shocks leads countries to start-o¤ relatively less constrained. This explains why the FDI share is closer to 50 percent and the volatilities are reduced to the values that would result in the perfect enforcement case. 24 Lower persistence also decreases the unconditional volatility of the aggregate shock. This is an additional explanation for the drop in the absolute magnitudes of the volatilities when ‡ows are measured in absolute values.
One startling result though, is the persistent volatility di¤erential across di¤erent values of ½, independently of how ‡ows are measured.
Lowering the degree of inalienability (i.e., increasing µ) reduces the FDI share. Also, independently of how in ‡ows are measured, there is a substantial reduction in the volatility di¤erential. The narrowed volatility gap was to be expected from the analytical results with iid shocks.
When FDI has no subsidies (A = 1), the simulated FDI shares are somewhat below the empirical values discussed below. If, for developing countries, FDI is also driven by tax advantages to FDI (A > 1), then the model is able to better …t the observed shares of international ‡ows.
This improvement comes with almost no change in relative volatilities. This con…rms the initial results for the perfect enforcement case that tax advantages are important determinants of the relative level of FDI versus other capital ‡ows, but not so much of the relative volatilities.
Increasing the production input shares results in ‡atter marginal product of capital curves.
This leads to greater volatility of either FDI and non-FDI in ‡ows. It also leads to greater levels of FDI and non-FDI, but relatively more so of the former. A second e¤ect is that countries start relatively more constrained. This second e¤ect tends to amplify both the level and volatility di¤erences between FDI and non-FDI ‡ows.
Model with Exogenous Exit
One unrealistic feature of the current setup is that countries grow to become unconstrained and that this state is absorbing. For the baseline parameterization used in subsection 4.2 this transition was quite fast. This raises the question of whether ‡ows will ever be constrained in a stationary distribution of countries.
A simple way to eliminate this absorbing state is to allow exogenous separation during the contract's life-time. Let º > 0 be the exogenous exit probability. Exit is assumed to occur at the end of the period after production has occurred and transfers are paid out. If a country exits the contract a new contract is o¤ered (possibly with a di¤erent lender) starting at utility V e . For simplicity, exit is independent of economic activity and at exit the lender gets nothing.
All agents observe and distinguish exogenous from endogenous separations.
The optimal …nancial contract with exogenous exit is obtained by solving (3), (4), B (V (s 0 ) ; s 0 )¸0 for all s 0 , and the promise keeping constraint:
In an equilibrium contract E (B (V e ; s 0 )) = I, where the expected value is computed under the distribution function F (:). 25 For the results in this subsection, I use the baseline parameterization with ® = :4, and also ® = :5, and let º = 0:02. This exit rate is consistent with the worldwide default experience in 2 5 The full enforcement value B F is changed accordingly. Starting from the stationary worldwide distribution of utility levels, I again run 50 simulations of 111 countries over 20 years. Using these simulated paths, Table 3 reports the worldwide standard deviation of HP-…ltered logged capital ‡ows. For example, for ® = :4, volatility of FDI is :022 and that of non-FDI ‡ows is :170. These numbers are lower than those reported in Table 2 but preserve the relative volatility di¤erences.
It is also possible to break the sample of countries into those that were in ongoing unbroken contracts in the 20 years of simulated data and those that did not. The …rst group of countries corresponds naturally to developed countries and the second to developing countries. Table 3 also presents the relative sizes of these subsets of countries as well as the numbers for the relative volatility of ‡ows. For ® = :4, developed countries represent 64 percent of the world, whereas this number drops to a more realistic 26 percent when ® = :5. As Proposition 2 showed, the capital ‡ow volatilities for developed countries are equal and ‡ow shares are 50 percent. Thus, it is not surprising that the worldwide di¤erences come from di¤erences in volatilities across developing countries.
Overall the quantitative results are particularly good for ® = :5. Recall that I had picked ® = :4 for the baseline case because it is the US estimate, but ® = :5 is also admissible given the numbers discussed above for developing countries. To see this note that with zero serial correlation in aggregate shocks the serial correlation in ‡ows for developed countries is zero whereas for developing countries is :171 for FDI and :086
for non-FDI (numbers not reported in the table). The internal propagation mechanism relies on risk sharing being provided to the domestic investor. If a high aggregate shock is followed by a lower shock, risk sharing guarantees that domestic output and consumption decline smoothly.
[ Table 3 here.]
The result that FDI ‡ows are more strongly serially correlated than non-FDI ‡ows for developing countries corroborates the view that non-FDI ‡ows are more short-term and footloose than FDI ‡ows (i.e., they are more likely to change direction). I discuss some evidence on serial correlation of ‡ows below.
Empirical Evidence on FDI and Financing Constraints
In this section I investigate the model's new prediction that FDI should be relatively higher for countries with greater …nancing constraints. The main dataset is the World Development
Indicators from the World Bank (1999b). 26 The sample covers virtually every country with a maximum time span from 1975 to 1997. As before, I use only private ‡ows to these countries and measure FDI and non-FDI ‡ows as percentages of gross private capital ‡ows (normalizing by GDP-PPP adjusted gives similar results). I also present some evidence on the serial correlation of ‡ows and relate this to the numbers in Table 3 .
FDI and Financing Constraints
The crudest test that I can make is to identify …nancing constraints with income per capita.
The International Monetary Fund reports that the 1990-98 average FDI shares of private ‡ows to the middle-income countries was roughly 50 percent and to low-income non-oil exporters (mineral producers) 70 percent. These numbers are consistent with Razin et al. (1998) who estimate that the FDI share on private ‡ows to developing countries was about 53 percent during 1990-95. 2 6 The WDI reports FDI in ‡ows from Balance of Payments data. This is subject to two major potential problems: (1) that investments are reported in the wrong category, and (2) that the 10 percent cut-o¤ rule is misleading. The second point is particularly important since this breakdown between FDI and other ‡ows is mostly intended at capturing the existence of a lasting interest in the company, for example, because of the transfer of intangible assets.
The problem is that GDP per capita does not provide a good exogenous measure of …nancing constraints. To overcome this di¢culty I turn to credit ratings for more direct measures of …nancing constraints. Credit ratings are correlated with measures of …nancing constraints to the extent that they measure the ability/cost of countries to access international capital markets.
One such measure is Moody's sovereign credit ratings. Moody's ratings are classi…ed as {Aaa,Aa,A,Baa,Ba,B,Caa,Ca,C}, from long term sovereign bonds and notes of the highest quality with interest payments "protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin and principal is secure" to a class of bonds with "extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any real investment standing" (Moody's Investors Service 1999). In each category from Aa through Caa Moody's applies numeric modi…ers of {1,2,3} from high rank to low rank, which I aggregate. I ignore the rating on debt placed through o¤-shore banks.
There are two main advantages of using sovereign credit ratings as a measure of …nancing constraints. One advantage of Moody's credit ratings is that these ratings measure only expected credit loss over the life of the security. Nevertheless, I recognize that Moody's sovereign credit rating may be associated with some Macroeconomic factors that a¤ect the desirability of international investors to lend to domestic private and o¢cial institutions, which would concurrently in ‡uence the capital budgeting decisions of multinational companies. 27 A second advantage of using Moody's ratings is that sovereign risk is arguably the best way to think about default risk in my model. Because in the model default occurs on both ‡ows simultaneously, it is better viewed as caused by the country's government. In fact, this is the case for most default that occurs through either direct or indirect expropriation (e.g. raising taxes or tari¤s and devaluing the domestic currency). Figure 4 illustrates the unconditional association between (end of the year) Moody's ratings and FDI ‡ows. In it, I plot the simple average share of FDI in ‡ows on gross private capital ‡ows by credit rating (solid bars). I treat each data point as a country-year observation and aggregate across country-years with identical credit rating. 28 The diamonds in the picture give 2 7 For example, restrictions on capital ‡ows may be observed in countries with lower credit ratings and with relatively higher FDI levels. Nevertheless, the e¤ect on the relative volatility of the di¤erent ‡ows is not immediately implied. 2 8 China has had the investment grade rating of 'A' since Moody's started rating its sovereign debt. This the number of observations used to compute each average (right axis). The …gure suggests that countries with lower credit ratings have greater in ‡ows of FDI.
[ Figure 4 here.]
I now analyze the power of this association in a conditional sense. I also report the same regressions with two other measures of country risk; one by Euromoney and the other by From panel A in Table 4 , these variables account for a signi…cant portion of the total variation in FDI: 17-23 percent. In fact, the explanatory power comes exclusively from the credit rating variable. The addition of other variables, though statistically signi…cant in some cases, does not contribute to an important increase in the explanatory power of the regression.
Also, the e¤ect is economically signi…cant: going from 'Aaa' rating to 'B' rating increases the share of FDI in gross private ‡ows by 9-14 percentage points. Furthermore, the slopes associated with the credit rating dummy variable display a quasi-monotonic behavior. It is interesting to note that the development of …nancial markets as measured by '…ndepth', or the stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP, does not eliminate the explanatory power of the measure of credit rating. This is important because it could be argued that credit rating proxies for underdeveloped capital markets: if there is limited scope for diversi…cation by international investors using marketable securities they will supply relatively more FDI.
[ Table 4 , Panel A here.]
Finally, the measure of law and order is also insigni…cant and leaves the estimates on the credit rating dummies almost unchanged.
To assess the robustness of the analysis I also conduct the estimations with two broad measures of country risk: one by Euromoney, 'EM', and another by Institutional Investor, 'iinv'. 'EM' measures political risk, access to short term …nancing, the likelihood of debt rescheduling, and economic risk; 100 being the safest and 0 the riskiest. Data for 'EM' is available for 1996 and 1997. 'iinv' ranking is based on a survey of international bankers, and is designed to capture political, economic, and …nancial risks, that might lead to credit default; The results are shown in Table 4B . The regressions with 'EM' and 'iinv' broadly con…rm the previous results that country credit ratings are strongly negatively associated with FDI.
By construction, these measures of country risk are much broader then Moody's sovereign default risk (hence, more subject to endogeneity problems). Even so, they show a very strong correlation; the Spearman correlation coe¢cient between 'moody' and 'EM' is .89 ('moody' is a variable that takes the value of 6 for a country with ranking Aaa, 5 if its ranking is Aa, and so on), between 'iinv' and 'moody' is .95, and between 'iinv' and 'EM' is .97. These facts could explain why these di¤erent ratings show such strong association with FDI, but also why output is no longer statistically signi…cant when I use EM or iinv instead of the dummy variables from Moody's. 31 Being broader measures of country risk they are also highly correlated with the index 'law' (linear correlations of .73 in absolute value) though not so much with stock market capitalization (linear correlations below .48 in absolute value). When I ignore the measures of country risk and regress the FDI share on gross ‡ows onto income, trade openness, and each of the other variables separately, only 'law' comes signi…cant, but with a positive coe¢cient.
A positive sign on 'law' indicates that this variable could proxy for better property rights protection or commitment technologies.
These measures of country risk rating still reveal an economically signi…cant impact on FDI.
For example, going from the best overall rating of 100 to the lowest possible rating increases the FDI share in gross private ‡ows by 10-40 percentage points according to 'EM' and by 10 percentage points according to 'iinv'. The estimated impact of Institutional Investor's country risk rating on the share of FDI is similar to that of Moody's sovereign credit rating.
Finally, in both panels of Table 4 , openness of a country does not seem to be important in explaining FDI ‡ows. It is however hard-and is not the purpose of this paper-to say that trade barriers do not explain FDI ‡ows. The only purpose of including this variable is to show that the robustness of the results survives including a measure of trade barriers. In other robustness checks I have also estimated these regressions including time dummies with similar results.
Excluding the OPEC countries in the sample also does not a¤ect the results.
Serial Correlation of FDI and Other Private Capital Flows
The model simulations indicated another property of the optimal contract and the stationary distribution under the baseline parameters. This property referred to a strong positive serial correlation of detrended capital in ‡ows, with FDI's serial correlation being higher than that of non-FDI ‡ows. Using the same annual WDI dataset, I compute the serial correlation of the share of FDI in ‡ows in gross ‡ows as well as the serial correlation of the share of other in ‡ows in gross ‡ows. As before, computing these statistics is legitimate because these measures of ‡ows are stationary. Most countries display a positive serial correlation in both ‡ows. For FDI the average annual serial correlation is :35 with a t-statistic of 10:3, and for non-FDI ‡ows 3 1 Note also that (i) the regression of the FDI share on lgdpc produces a slope coe¢cient of -.028 signi…cant at the 1 percent level, but an R 2 of only .5 percent, and (ii) the correlation coe¢cient between lgdpc and EM is 0.87, and that between lgdpc and iinv is 0.75. Recall from Table 3 that the model can match these serial correlations reasonably well. It can also match the fact that the empirical average serial correlation of FDI is higher than that of non-FDI, though it should be noted that a test of equality of means on the average serial correlations using the WDI data cannot be rejected at the usual signi…cance levels.
Policy Implications and Final Remarks
The high volatility and low persistence of non-FDI capital ‡ows to developing economies have generally been negatively portrayed in the media. The model developed here suggests that these characteristics simply re ‡ect the optimal responses of international investors to changes in default risk. The model also suggests that the relatively large proportion of FDI in private capital ‡ows to less developed countries re ‡ects their poor …nancial status rather than any comparative advantage. This does not mean that FDI is bad for these economies, but rather that FDI is all that they can get. From a normative standpoint the model suggests that countries trying to expand their access to international capital markets should concentrate on developing credible enforcement mechanisms for repayment. Clearly, this is not easy to accomplish, but the international …nance theory suggests some ways to go about it, such as opening the domestic economy to trade (e.g. Bulow and Rogo¤ 1989) . This would allow credit-constrained economies to attract more of FDI as well as larger short term portfolio equity and bond ‡ows.
There are other dimensions of international capital ‡ows that are worth exploring in the context of models where imperfect enforcement in international contracts plays a central role. . This is because, once capital accumulation is allowed in autarky, it becomes very di¢cult to sustain borrowing and lending among countries (similarly to Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) ). In a sense these models provide an answer to Lucas ' (1990) question, but an extreme one. 32 This paper studies two international …nancial instruments, di¤erentiated by their risk sharing potential. Assets that are inalienable-and thus useless under autarky-can be used to provide greater insurance and market integration under imperfect enforcement of contracts. Analyzing these issues in the context of general equilibrium models with enforcement constraints is an interesting research avenue.
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2 . Letting Ã (s 0 ) = 0 for all s 0 in equations (7) and (8) we obtain the …rst order conditions: E (s 0 js) A® f k
o´c an be easily computed from these conditions. There is no default premium. Note that countries are heterogeneous only through di¤erent realizations of the aggregate shock.
Using the …rst order conditions, the ratio of input elasticities to changes in s is:
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the …rst order conditions (7) and (8) and replace the values of U k f and U k o by their expressions to get: ) js] > 0, so that the domestic consumer is …nancially constrained, it must be that
. That is, the default premium of FDI is lower than that of non-FDI. When A¸1, and
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider conditions (9) and (10) in the proof of Proposition 3.
Note that with iid shocks the current shock does not a¤ect the value of capital and countries are heterogenous with respect to V only. Clearly, each time the country is unconstrained ª(V ) = 0 and the elasticities of capital inputs to changes in V are zero. When ª (V ) > 0, solving (9) and (10) for ª (V; s), it is possible to write k f as a function of k o . Di¤erentiating the resulting expression for k f I get:
where I have used (9) and (10) to get to the second equality. When ® f · ® o this ratio is less than one if, and only if µ < 1, because the numerator and denominator are both positive. .007 Unconditional variance of the shock Table 2 . Simulation Results. 
